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Expanding Access to Patents for 
COVID-19
SUMMARY. Two competing and linked sets of goals must be addressed when considering patent policy in 
response to a public health emergency. First is the allocation of existing resources among potential users 
(hospitals, patients, etc.); second is the creation of new technologies over time (innovation). Patents provide 
financial incentives to develop new technologies. Yet shortages of patented products often plague crisis 
response. In the case of COVID-19, allocative goals, particularly satisfying demand for patented medical 
products (e.g., vaccines, ventilators, PPE, and test kits), may be achieved through governmental interventions 
such as march-in and governmental use rights (compulsory licensing). But in cases involving the development 
of new technologies such as vaccines and therapies, incentive structures must be preserved to ensure 
that the private sector is appropriately motivated to act. In addition to patents, which reward inventors for 
financially successful innovations, a range of other incentives such as prizes, grants, and subsidies also 
exist to motivate technological innovation. Incentives like these, coupled with a requirement that resulting 
discoveries be made available on a broad and open basis, can achieve a balance between allocation and 
innovation goals. Governments can encourage such measures using both the incipient threat of compulsory 
licensing and the reward of procurement preferences and other up-front rewards. 
Jorge L. Contreras, JD, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law; Department of Human Genetics, 
University of Utah School of Medicine
Introduction
As COVID-19 spread around the world in early 2020, reports 
emerged of patent-based threats against manufacturers of 
products – such as ventilator valves and diagnostic test kits – 
needed to address the emerging public health crisis. Countries 
including Germany, France, Israel, and Canada rushed to enact 
policies to suspend patent rights on vaccines and drugs that could 
be used to combat the pandemic. Echoing concerns over the 
inaccessibility of patented vaccine technologies during the SARS 
and Ebola outbreaks, the World Health Organization (WHO) issued a 
global call to action, urging governments and the private sector to 
make patents broadly available in the fight against COVID-19. This 
Chapter offers a framework for U.S. policymakers as they consider 
different responses to COVID-19 that may implicate patented 
technologies.
Patents and the “Access versus Incentives” Tradeoff
Two competing sets of goals must be addressed when considering 
patent policy. Allocative considerations relate to the distribution 
of existing resources among potential users. In terms of many 
patented technologies – e.g., smart phones, aircraft engines, 
food additives – market forces do a pretty good job of allocating 
products to those who value them most highly (Landes & Posner, 
2003). However, in some cases, simple market action may not 
achieve desired policy goals. Thus, in the case of patented drugs 
and health care equipment, considerations such as distributive 
justice, public health, health equity, and humanitarianism may 
lead policymakers to consider interventions designed to promote 
greater public access to these technologies than the market alone 
would provide (Outterson, 2005; Lee, 2017). Such interventions 
may seek to influence product demand (e.g., by subsidizing users 
through public assistance programs like Medicare and Medicaid) 
or supply (e.g., by relaxing patent restrictions in order to enable a 
wider range of suppliers to produce the desired product and offer 
it at a reduced price (often referred to as compulsory licensing – 
see below)). 
Unlike allocative considerations, dynamic considerations relate to 
the creation of new technologies over time. Patents are designed 
to promote innovation, as they provide financial incentives to 
producers of successful new technologies (at least those that 
are valued by the market). In addition to patents, other incentive 
mechanisms exist to encourage innovation, including grants, 
prizes, and tax incentives (Hemel & Ouellette, 2019). In many cases, 
several of these incentives can work in tandem (e.g., a grant-
funded project that leads to a patentable invention and gives its 
owner the benefit of a research and development (R&D) tax credit).
These factors do not exist independently of one another, and 
interventions with respect to one will often affect the other. In 
some cases, allocative interventions may promote innovation, 
as when the government subsidizes individual purchases of a 
patented drug, thereby ensuring patient access to the drug while 
at the same time rewarding its developer and funding future 
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research. Yet, in other cases, allocative interventions such as 
compulsory licensing of patents (described below), may depress 
an innovator’s financial returns and thus reduce its incentive to 
innovate further. This “access versus incentives” tradeoff is one 
of the fundamental tensions in intellectual property law (Landes & 
Posner, 2003; Outterson, 2005; Hemel & Ouellette, 2019). And while 
such tradeoffs can be justified in the pursuit of legitimate policy 
goals, it is important for policymakers to understand their nature 
and extent when considering different policy interventions. This 
Chapter briefly outlines policy considerations surrounding access 
and incentive policy interventions pertinent to COVID-19. 
Access to Existing Technologies 
Once a particular technology exists, there is no further need to 
incentivize its creation. While it may be desirable to incentivize 
the creation of improvements and follow-on innovations, policy 
decisions largely shift to allocative issues (access). Compulsory 
licensing is a legal mechanism designed to increase access to 
patented technologies that are being undersupplied by the market 
(i.e., by the patent holder and its delegates). When imposing 
a compulsory license, the government effectively requires a 
patent holder to license its patents to one or more third party 
manufacturers (usually at a reasonable rate) in order to ensure 
the continuity of, or an increase in, production and supply of the 
patented technology. 
Unlike many countries, the United States lacks a general statutory 
framework for the compulsory licensing of patented technologies. 
However, U.S. law does possess two statutory mechanisms that 
achieve similar results: federal march-in rights under the Bayh-
Dole Act of 1980 (35 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.) and governmental use 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1498. These two mechanisms are explained below.
March-In Rights under the Bayh-Dole Act 
The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 allows researchers to patent inventions 
arising from federally-funded research. In return, the Act 
authorizes the government to exercise so-called ‘march in’ rights, 
which compel the owner of any such patent to license it to one or 
more third parties to the extent necessary, among other things, to 
address health or safety needs. Numerous petitions have been filed 
over the years urging federal agencies to exercise their march-in 
rights under the Act, primarily in cases involving undersupplied or 
costly pharmaceutical products (Thomas, 2016). To date, however, 
neither the National Institutes of Health nor any other federal 
agency has exercised march-in rights under the Act. 
While the federal government has been urged to exercise its 
Bayh-Dole march-in rights in the context of the COVID-19 response 
(e.g., with respect to vaccine technologies partially funded 
through federal programs), march-in rights have limitations. Most 
importantly, they apply only to inventions that were made using 
federal funding. While many vaccine and drug candidates have 
arisen from grant-funded university laboratories, a significant 
amount of biomedical research is conducted in the private sector 
without federal support. Nevertheless, march-in rights under 
the Bayh-Dole Act are valuable tools that have the potential to 
lift patent barriers that might impede the supply of at least some 
needed goods and services. 
Governmental Use 
Section 1498 of chapter 28 of the United States Code is not 
a compulsory licensing law, but a limited waiver by the U.S. 
government of its sovereign immunity. Under this statute, if the 
federal government (itself or through its contractors) uses or 
manufactures a patented invention without the permission of 
the owner, the owner cannot prevent this use, but may sue the 
government to recover “reasonable and entire compensation” in the 
U.S. Court of Federal Claims. 
Since its enactment in the early 20th century, the federal 
government has periodically invoked § 1498 in cases relating to the 
procurement of military and other equipment. Less frequently, 
§ 1498 has been used to bolster the U.S. supply of drugs and 
biomedical technologies at prices lower than those charged 
by patent holders. During a three-year period in the 1960s, the 
Department of Defense’s Military Medical Supply Agency (MMSA) 
utilized § 1498 to obtain supplies of approximately 50 drugs 
including the antibiotic tetracycline (Brennan et al., 2016). Though 
the federal government’s use of § 1498 in the pharmaceutical 
sector declined by the 1970s, the Department of Health and Human 
Services threatened to invoke the statute in 2001 during the post-
9/11 anthrax scare (Brennan et al., 2016). Since then, commentators 
have proposed using the government’s powers under § 1498 to drive 
down drug prices, but no meaningful utilization of this power has 
occurred for pharmaceutical products in nearly two decades. 
But today, with highly publicized shortages of coronavirus testing 
kits, facial masks, ventilators, and other critical supplies, the 
prospect of U.S. government intervention through § 1498 has again 
gained traction. Section 1498 is a viable mechanism for addressing 
pandemic-related shortages of any product or service required by 
the federal government or its contractors.
Commentators who have analyzed the use of § 1498 in connection 
with the supply of drugs have expressed concern over its limited 
scope: it only applies to products that are “used or manufactured 
by or for the United States” (Brennan et al., 2016). In the context of 
ordinary prescription drugs, this scope might not be broad enough 
to address the needs of patients whose drug costs are covered by 
private insurers or health plans. However, the case for government 
use (and the applicability of § 1498) is stronger in the context of 
the new coronavirus, which the federal government has declared 
a national emergency. To the extent the federal government 
supports, procures, distributes, or administers coronavirus 
tests, vaccines, treatments, or equipment, such activity could be 
classified as government use under the terms of § 1498.
Incentivizing the Development of New (and Open) 
Technologies
While existing technologies are largely (though not entirely) the 
subject of allocative/access policy interventions, a different 
calculus exists with respect to as-yet-undiscovered technologies. 
In these cases, the focus is largely on incentivizing the discovery/
creation of the new technology, whether it be a vaccine, a 
therapeutic, or a medical device. Under ordinary circumstances, 
patents are effective mechanisms for incentivizing innovation: if 
granted, they allow the inventor to extract rent from the market 
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over a multi-year period without close competition. In the case of 
new prescription drugs, patents enable manufacturers to recoup 
far more than even their substantial R&D costs. As an intervention, 
patents do not impose a direct cost on the government (though 
when government programs purchase patented drugs, they 
effectively subsidize the inventor), and they generally reward 
innovations that are successful in the market, eliminating any need 
to evaluate their quality independently. 
However, patents are not always well-calibrated to address social 
needs. Because their payoff is entirely market-driven, patents 
incentivize innovations that are likely to be the most lucrative, 
rather than the most beneficial (hence the tendency of some 
firms to focus R&D dollars on hair loss treatments and diet pills 
rather than the eradication of rare diseases). In normal times, 
governments can seek to guide innovation in socially beneficial 
directions through a variety of incentive mechanisms: extended 
periods of market exclusivity for ‘orphan drugs’ directed to 
rare diseases, research grants targeted at diseases affecting 
underserved populations, and the like. But in times of emergency, 
more urgent measures may be required. 
Prizes for Open Innovation
In addition to patents, mechanisms such as grants, subsidies, 
tax incentives, and prizes are used to incentivize innovation. 
The field of vaccine development offers a useful illustration. In 
general, vaccine development does not begin until a particular 
disease strain is identified and recognized as a significant threat 
(Rutschman, 2018). Patents are often held by diverse entities, 
making consolidation and effective R&D difficult (Rutschman, 2018; 
Rutschman 2019). Moreover, vaccines are generally viewed as less 
profitable than therapeutic drugs, further contributing to their 
lack of development (Rutschman, 2019; Xue & Ouellette, 2020). 
And while the number of patents covering vaccine technologies 
continues to rise, vaccine development is still severely lacking 
(Rutschman, 2019). 
The problem of optimizing vaccine development is dynamic 
— it relates not to the allocation of existing resources, but to 
the creation of new ones. To incentivize vaccine development 
during a major disease outbreak, some commentators have 
proposed increasing monetary incentives for successfully 
producing a vaccine in the form of substantial grants, subsidies, 
or prizes (Lichtman, 2018; Xue & Ouellette, 2020). An important 
condition of such financial incentives could be a requirement 
that the awardee make any resulting patents openly available 
to the public, at least for purposes of COVID-19 response. This 
requirement would “open” patents for all to use in connection 
with the present emergency, thus addressing allocative issues, 
while at the same time permitting the innovator to monetize the 
invention in other fields and settings (i.e., therapies for diseases 
other than COVID-19), thereby reducing impediments to dynamic 
innovation (see, e.g., the Open COVID Pledge (opencovidpledge.
org), which allows a patent holder to pledge its technology for 
free usage in addressing the COVID-19 pandemic, while retaining 
the right to charge for it elsewhere). 
Encouraging Patent Pools
According to some accounts, the largest barrier to effective 
vaccine development is not insufficient funding during an outbreak 
(when funding often increases dramatically), but the inability of 
diverse patent holders to cooperate to productively combine their 
technologies (Rutschman, 2018; Rutschman, 2019). Accordingly, the 
twin issues of rights fragmentation and lack of coordination must 
be addressed (Heller & Eisenberg, 1998). 
One well-known method for addressing these related issues is the 
pooling of patents held by multiple parties – making those patents 
available as a group to others in the industry. In cases of national 
emergency, government can encourage (or pressure) private 
parties to participate in such arrangements. This approach was 
famously employed in the months prior to U.S. entry into World 
War I. At that time, “the development of the aircraft industry in 
the United States was seriously retarded by the existence of 
a chaotic situation concerning the validity and ownership of 
important aeronautical patents” (“MAA v. United States,” 1933). 
Fearing that the military would be unable to procure sufficient 
aircraft, government officials pressured the two leading holders 
of aviation patents, Wright-Martin and Curtiss-Burgess, to pool 
their patents with the rest of the industry, thereby alleviating fears 
throughout the industry that the manufacture of aircraft would lead 
to litigation.
Patent pools have been proposed in connection with viral 
outbreaks before, including the 2002-03 SARS outbreak, the 2005 
H5N1 influenza outbreak, and the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic. 
Yet, despite the perceived need for aggregation of distributed 
patent rights in order to combat these diseases, patent pools were 
never formed for a variety of practical and competitive reasons. In 
March 2020, the government of Costa Rica called on the WHO to 
form a patent pool relating to COVID-19. Such a pool, which could 
address a range of technologies beyond vaccines, would clearly be 
beneficial to public health.
In the United States, the government could encourage the 
formation of one or more COVID-19 pools using a carrot and stick 
approach. On one hand (the stick), government can threaten to 
enact compulsory licensing mechanisms to compel patent holders 
to make their patents available to competitors if they do not 
voluntarily accede to such a pool. On the other hand (the carrot), 
government can commit to procure relevant medical products only 
from participants in such pools. 
Conclusion
Formulating patent policy to address public health crises involves 
both allocative considerations as well as incentives for innovation. 
Neither can be ignored, so solutions that achieve some balance 
between broad access to patented technologies and incentives for 
future technology development are needed. Fortunately, several 
such approaches are available in the area of COVID-19 response 
and remediation. 
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3675857
ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19   •   AUGUST 2020   •   WWW.COVID19POLICYPLAYBOOK.ORG   •   161
CHAPTER 21   •  EXPANDING ACCESS TO PATENTS FOR COVID-19
Recommendations for Action
Federal government:
• The federal government, acting 
through the Centers for Disease 
Control or another appropriate agency, 
should assess the patent landscape 
for technologies critical to COVID-19 
response, including the licensing 
practices of key patent holders, 
and identify any areas in which the 
combination of patent protection 
and a demonstrated unwillingness of 
patent holders to make their rights 
available to others could plausibly 
hinder the rapid development and 
deployment of technologies necessary 
to combat the pandemic.
• With respect to such patents, 
the government should develop 
and publish a plan for asserting 
governmental use and march-in rights 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 and the Bayh-
Dole Act, with the proviso that any 
patent holder that voluntarily pledges 
its patents for COVID-19 response on a 
broad, royalty-free basis (e.g., the Open 
COVID Pledge) would not be subject to 
such measures.
• In areas key to COVID-19 response, the 
government should select technology 
targets requiring further research 
and development and develop 
incentive programs (e.g., prizes, 
grants, subsidies) to encourage their 
development, with the proviso that any 
resulting technologies should be made 
available under broad, royalty-free 
terms (e.g., the Open COVID Pledge) for 
purposes of COVID-19 response.
• The government should encourage 
users of complementary patents to form 
patent pools, and commit to procuring 
products and supplies only from entities 
participating in such pools.
State governments:
• In areas key to COVID-19 response, 
state governments should select 
technology targets requiring further 
research and development and develop 
incentive programs (e.g., prizes, 
grants, subsidies) to encourage their 
development, with the proviso that any 
resulting technologies should be made 
available under broad, royalty-free 
terms (e.g., the Open COVID Pledge) for 
purposes of COVID-19 response.
• The government should encourage 
users of complementary patents to form 
patent pools, and commit to procuring 
products and supplies only from entities 
participating in such pools.
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